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The results of sport would not interest us if either they were necessitated or they were a matter of 
pure chance. And if either case were true, the playing of sport would seem to make no sense either. 
This poses a dilemma. But there is something between these two options, namely the dispositional 
modality. Sporting prowess can be understood as a disposition towards victory and sporting 
liabilities a disposition towards defeat. The sporting contest then pits these net prowesses against 
each other. The stronger will tend to beat the weaker but no more than tend. This makes sense of 
the sporting contest in which the weaker knows they still can win. The stronger team can lose 
though they don’t tend to do so. The dilemma is thus escaped. 
 
 
Why watch? Why play? 
If we believed the outcome of a sporting contest was a fait accompli, it would have virtually no 
interest to us. Much of the excitement of watching sport comes from the knowledge that the result 
is in doubt, open, and up for grabs. If one knew the game was fixed, for instance, it would thereby 
lose all sporting interest for us, even if there were other non-sporting interests. This suggests that 
what truly interests us about sport is the idea that the outcomes are not a matter of necessity or 
determined. If we thought they were, something of the essence of sport would be lost. Similarly, one 
might watch a replay of a sporting event knowing already the outcome and while one might have a 
good reason to do so, and find some aspects of it useful or captivating, such interest cannot lie in the 
excitement one has in knowing the result to be undecided.  
We do not want sporting outcomes to be necessary, it seems. Yet the alternative looks unattractive 
too. Suppose winning and losing in sport were really matters of pure chance, such that they might as 
well be determined on the toss of a coin. That would seem to be no better, if not worse. Coin tossing 
would not make for good spectator sport, nor do other games of pure chance such as roulette, as 
Kretchmar says (2012, 115). One might have an interest in roulette if one has placed a bet or has an 
interest in the one who placed the bet. But this is not a sporting interest, it should be said. There is 
nothing of sporting interest in pure chance, if the outcome is random. Why would we watch athletes 
toil and strive if that toiling and striving had no influence on the outcome? What would be the 
relevance of such actions? And what would be the interest in the sport result itself if it were a 
matter of pure chance? We might as well just enjoy the toiling and striving and pay no heed at all to 
the result, which would seem an irrelevance. Our interest in sport cannot, it seems, be premised on 
pure indeterminism. The athletes’ actions must have some bearing on the outcomes. 
This presents us with something of a problem when it comes to understanding the basis of sport. It 
would be of no interest to us if the outcome were necessitated but also no interest to us if the 
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outcome were a matter of nothing but chance. And this dilemma concerns not just our interests in 
watching sport but also it concerns those who play sport. 
Suppose, for instance, that in football, the team that was higher in the league ladder always beat a 
team that was lower. The lower-ranked team literally has no chance, under this supposition. But 
what then is the point of them turning up? And even if they do turn up, what point is there in them 
trying? Similarly for the stronger team: if they know they will win, come what may, why should they 
take the contest seriously? Now there are indeed some individuals and teams in sport that do start 
to believe they are bound to win, but what is interesting about sport is that through complacency, 
such over-confidence often does result in a surprise defeat. Without that possibility, sport would 
seem to have no meaning or point for the competitors. No one should think when they start the 
game that the result is necessitated and it is very hard to see how they could effectively engage with 
the contest if they have that understanding. 
Just as we would have no interest in watching a game where the eventual outcome was randomly 
determined, it is also hard to see why anyone would bother playing such a game of sport. Why 
would one bother training and preparing, for instance, if all one’s efforts bore no relation to the 
outcome and did not help one win the contest? No one seriously trains to play roulette, for instance 
– nor any other game of pure chance – because that cannot affect the outcome. Indeed, it should 
not do so if it is to remain an honest game of chance as roulette is advertised to be. Instead, athletes 
attempt every preparation, mental and physical, and exert all available energy in an attempt to 
influence the result. But one cannot influence a result if it is either a matter of pure necessity or a 
matter of pure chance. Sport cannot be premised on either of these two options, therefore. 
 
The metaphysics of determinism 
Nevertheless, in metaphysics these two extremes – of necessity or randomness – are often 
presented as if they are indeed the only two options. There is a thesis of determinism, for instance, 
which tells us that all events in the universe are fixed by prior events (for an account of determinism, 
see Honderich 2005 and for a survey of the whole area see Kane (ed.) 2011). Given what has passed 
before, there is only one possible future. The total state of the universe at time t, together with the 
laws of nature, allow only one state of the universe at time t + . All then becomes necessary even if 
our own experience of free will conflicts with reality. It feels as if we have free will but if one decides 
to step to the left rather than step to the right, one was determined to do so irrespective of the 
feeling of freedom one gains in introspection.  
Determinism is a metaphysical thesis of philosophy. It is hard to see how it could have an empirical 
proof that was anything more than theoretical. But it seems to be a thesis that we cannot seriously 
believe if we are to have an interest in sport. Similarly, it is hard to understand how we should 
behave generally if determinism is true. Should we stop making decisions? We are not in a position 
to do so. And should we stop believing that our actions have any influence? Again, it seems hard to 
understand how we could do that. Necessity would then present a very general problem for 
conscious beings such as us, and the case of sport illustrates that problem perfectly.  
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We are not going into detail here on the issue of whether determinism is true or false. For the 
record, we think it false. Popper (1982: 28) made a good point: determinism is such a strong thesis – 
falsified by just one undetermined event, no matter how small – that we should consider it false by 
default. The burden of proof is then on the determinist; and they will have much work to do. But we 
neither intend nor pretend to give a convincing argument here, which would have to be developed 
at length. What is important, however, is simply the idea that a belief in the necessity of sporting 
outcomes would undermine entirely any motivation to play or watch it. We play and watch as if the 
outcomes are not necessary. That belief may well be false, if determinism turns out after all to have 
been true all along. And if so, our playing sport as if it is not a matter of necessity would itself have 
been determined. That seems a very unfortunate position in which to be. 
A problem has been, however, that the free will debate has been framed in such a way that the 
alternative to determinism is considered to be the contingent, stochastic, chancy world. This latter 
thesis can be interpreted to mean that all is random or pure chance. As has been suggested, this 
seems no help in the case of sport and it is no help generally in gaining us free will, agency or 
autonomy. Just as we don’t want to be slaves to necessity, we also do not want to be slaves to 
chance. To be free, we want not just that determinism is false but at the same time that we retain 
ultimate authorship of our actions (see Kane 1996, 4). If an action is determined by some random 
event occurring in one’s brain, for instance, arguably one has lost that authorship. What is needed in 
order to gain free will is an indeterminism that does not undermine our conscious agency and 
subsequent responsibility. We will find that these metaphysical dilemmas surface in the case of 
sport, the proper understanding of which might even illuminate the more general free will problem. 
 
The dispositional modality 
Modality is a term that comes from the modification of a proposition (see Melia 2003). As well as 
saying that something is true, one could add that it is a necessary truth, using the modal operator of 
necessity. One might claim it is not merely true that night follows day but also necessary that it does 
so. And one might say that something false is nevertheless a real possibility. The door is brown but it 
is possible that it be white. This contrasts with the falsehood that 2 + 2 = 5, which is not even 
possibly true. Are necessity and possibility the only modal values? Much contemporary discussion of 
modality proceeds as if so. 
There is a space, however, between the modalities of necessity and pure contingency. We have 
argued elsewhere (Mumford and Anjum 2011a, ch. 8 and 2011b) that the main modality of 
causation is what we call the dispositional modality. This is a two in one modality: there is a 
tendency towards a certain outcome, but one that can be counteracted. Striking a match doesn’t 
necessitate that it light. Something can go wrong. But striking a match bears some relation to the 
match’s lighting that is more than pure chance. The match has a real disposition of flammability that 
brings about the lighting on those occasions where the struck match does indeed light. But even in 
those cases where the struck match lit, it need not have done so had something else been added: for 
example if someone at the same time blew on it. The idea of the dispositional modality is that the 
flammable object tends – but no more than tends – to burn in certain circumstances. The match 
disposes towards burning when struck where such a disposition is short of necessity. But a 
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disposition towards an outcome is more than pure chance. The match has no disposition to 
evaporate when struck, to double in size or to become organic. In a world of pure chance, 
presumably anything could follow anything else. But this does not seem to be the case in our world 
in which there are causal connections. Certain outcomes tend to occur, given what has followed, and 
we come to rely on these expected outcomes, even though we know expectations can sometimes be 
disappointed. It may take a couple of match strikes to get it to light but we know that striking it is 
the surest way to initiate that disposition. 
More could be said about the dispositional modality, and about the metaphysics of dispositions or 
causal powers that sits behind it (see also Mumford 1998, Mumford 2004 and Molnar 2003). But the 
main task of this paper is to show how the dispositional modality makes sense of sport, both from a 
participant and spectator point of view, by avoiding the twin perils of necessity and pure chance in 
the determination of sporting outcomes. 
 
Sporting prowess 
The key to this solution involves understanding sporting prowess as a disposition, which then gives 
the holder a tendency towards victory. The total sporting prowess in relation to a particular sport 
will be formed by a complex of many different dispositions or abilities, both physical and mental. 
Being physically fit, strong and agile are useful in most sports. Some sports may require very specific 
prowesses, however, such as height being an advantage in basketball, weight being an advantage in 
boxing, a steady hand an advantage in snooker, and strong mental resolve an advantage in the 
marathon. One kind of prowess might be underlying whereas another is temporary. An athlete 
might try to get ‘into the zone’ so that for the short duration of the contest they are at the height of 
concentration exactly because this will increase their disposition to win. Tendencies typically come in 
degrees, just as a car windscreen and a wine glass might both be fragile but the latter to a greater 
degree than the former. So in sport, where strength is an advantage, clearly it is not an all or nothing 
matter. One person might be stronger than another, faster than another or better concentrated 
than another. 
Some dispositions improve with practice (see Aristotle’s discussion of virtue, for instance, in 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1114a onwards) just as one can become a better speaker of a foreign language 
the more one exercises that ability. For sports preparation, therefore, we practice more so as to 
build up a prowess and make it second nature. A goalkeeper might face numerous shots in training 
so that the ability to save a shot comes automatically when the situation arises in a real game 
situation. But some powers can also be depleted during the course of their exercise. Athletic energy, 
for instance, is notoriously subject to depletion through its use and when we use the term stamina 
we are talking about how resilient and long-lasting is someone’s energetic capability. 
Just as there are prowesses that tend towards success, we have to acknowledge that athletes have 
weaknesses or liabilities that tend away from success (see Mumford 2011, ch. 10). One athlete might 
be less observant than another, less concentrated, less agile, may have a fragile confidence or a 
weak knee, might be slow on the turn, understrength in the thigh muscles, and so on. Such liabilities 
subtract from an athlete’s total sporting prowess. We can see that the overall aptitude of an 
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individual or team will be a net total of strengths (disposing towards success) minus weaknesses 
(disposing away from success). 
The sporting contest can then be thought of as a contest between the different sporting prowesses 
of the competitors. Each athlete brings their own net strengths and skills to the competition and pits 
them against their opponent’s and, in the case of team sports, adds them to the strength of their 
team which is then pitted as a whole against an opposing team. 
 
The tendential view of the contest 
Let us then return to the dilemma. Sport would have no point if the outcomes were either necessary 
or pure chance. How can we escape this? We do so by seeing that there is a third modal option: 
something that sits between the two unpalatable cases.  
Each athlete or team brings their net sum of sporting prowess to the contest. These are set against 
those of the opposition. This allows us to make a further calculation. If the net sporting prowess of 
competitor A is greater than that of competitor B then there is an additional result: A will tend to 
beat B. This can be represented graphically in a vector diagram (figure 1) that shows the tendencies 
towards success of A and B and the net overall tendency – a resultant vector R – pointing in one 
direction or the other. A zero resultant vector is possible if two sides are overall evenly matched and 
they would then tend to beat each other in equal measure. 
 
 
Figure 1: The net prowess of team A is greater than that of team B 
 
This is where the dispositional modality of tendencies is vital. A is better than B and will tend to beat 
them, but this nevertheless does not mean that A must win and B must lose. There is no guarantee, 
no necessity. And this is just how we want it and how we must understand the sporting contest. B 
might know full well that they are weaker than A. Looking at the league standings would provide 
enough evidence of that. But there is indeed some reason for them to turn up and play. They can 
consistently accept both that A is stronger than them and that they still have a chance. Betting odds 
are precisely an attempt to estimate what those relative chances are, hence relative strengths of the 
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One could nevertheless expect that the more often A and B play, A’s tendency to win will be 
manifested in a higher proportion of wins than B. This is why a league season, with all teams playing 
each other over a long time and many total contests, is a good way of measuring the relative 
strengths of the team. But competitions with one-off knockout ties and play-offs can be more 
exciting precisely because weaker teams have a chance of succeeding in a single encounter. 
Some of this analysis appears in Kretchmar’s (2005) account of game flaws. The more skilful 
interchanges there are in a sporting contest, the more likely it is that the better team’s prowess will 
win out. Tendencies will manifest themselves the greater the number of trials, just as the 
distribution of heads and tails is not guaranteed to be 50:50 in any finite sequence of trials but will 
tend to 50:50 the greater the number of trials. The weaker team thus has a chance, just as a loaded 
coin in favour of heads could still on some occasions nevertheless land tails. But there is a crucial 
difference between coins and sports, which is that the outcome of the game is not chancy in this 
way. The players are real agents, able to affect the outcome by exploiting the other team’s 
weaknesses and manifesting their own prowess to its maximum degree. 
While this view sounds right, it is hard to agree that it constitutes a game flaw simply if a sport 
allows a weaker team to win. One should argue, instead, that this possibility is of the essence of 
sport. Without that possibility of victory, the weaker team really has no sporting motivation. Perhaps 
one might infer that Kretchmar would see the perfect sport to be the one that always delivered the 
win for the better team. But this would be very dull to watch and pretty pointless to play, as argued 
above. And this raises the bigger question of what is the point of sport. Contrary to what might be 
implied by Kretchmar’s (2005) account, the point of sport is not to ensure that the strongest always 
wins. Kretchmar (2012) has since given a more nuanced view that acknowledges the role of luck in 
sport, to which we will return. Arguably, the point is not even to determine which is the strongest. 
Perhaps there are in any case better and more accurate ways of doing that: looking at the league 
ladder, measuring the players’ weights and heights, or inspecting the record books, for instance. But 
if sport aimed to ensure the strongest wins, one really is asking the weaker just to turn up as a 
means to that end, with no chance of their own success. This would go against the fundamental 
tenet of Kantian ethics, which states that persons are ends in themselves. 
Now of course one might think that the strongest always does win the contest simply because the 
victory is what determines who is the strongest from a group of competitors. But this view, what 
Loland (2002: 89) calls the cynical view, should be resisted. If the winner is strongest by analytic 
definition, it means that relative strengths and weakness would lose all their power to explain how 
victory and defeat is produced causally. The account developed thus far allows us to say that net 
sporting prowess is what produces, and thereby causally explains, the win. If, on the other hand, one 
takes victory as definitive of being the strongest, it is a trivial statement to say that the strongest 
team won. On the contrary, if relative strength causally explains the outcome then it is perfectly 
permissible, as it should be, to say that on a particular occasion the better team lost. This cannot be 
done if the winner is the best by definition. 
The account explains how victory can be produced but without being necessitated. A disposition 
tends to success but doesn’t guarantee it. There may be odd little events, unexpected and outside 
the control of the competitors, that deny the stronger side their victory. The sun might break 
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through the clouds and blind a tennis player just at the crucial point, the ball might bobble at the 
most inopportune moment, a perfectly good golf shot might be blown off course just inches from 
the hole, an old injury might flare up, an opponent might choose at random exactly the right 
weakness to exploit, and so on. One thing is to have the powers; another is to know how to use 
them, when to use them, how much to use, how to exploit a weakness and when to do so. Even the 
weaker skills, deployed at the right time in the right way, can beat stronger skills. Many of the 
factors that produce the outcome concern the deliberate sporting actions of the opponents and how 
they use their prowesses. And even in the cases where the weaker opponent does not get it right 
and secure an unexpected victory, it was a possibility that they did. Hence, even where the strongest 
wins, it was still possible that they lost had things been different. This shows that causal production, 
even where successful, is not the same as necessitation. We avoid, therefore, the peril of necessity 
robbing sport of its point. 
The dispositional modality at work also avoids the peril of pure chance. It is no mere coincidence 
that those who practice and train the hardest thereby increase their tendency to win. Their prowess 
is a disposition towards success. If the connection between prowess and victory was a truly random 
one, no one would have any interest in developing their strengths and skills. In a world of pure 
chance, anything really could follow anything else and there would thus be no reason for spectators 
or participants to think that sporting outcomes were a result of the endeavours on the field. Playing 
a golf shot aimed perfectly at the hole could result in the ball going in any direction, or evaporating 
or growing wings and flying.  
Instead, sporting prowesses are worth developing because while they cannot guarantee victory they 
nevertheless can tend towards it, dependent on a relative comparison with the prowesses of one’s 
opponent. Having some disposition towards victory is what makes sport more than a game of 
chance such as roulette. The athlete has some influence over the outcome when they exercise their 
athletic abilities. In a game that is intended to be of chance alone, one is on the contrary barred 
from affecting the outcome. Someone may try to do so, with loaded dice, use of magnets and so on, 
but such causal interventions are illegitimate within those games. Sports will have their own rules 
about which interventions are legitimate – not all are – but the thesis is that for sport to have any 
point, the athlete’s efforts must have a say in the outcome. The victor must have some authorship of 
the victory. It is not sole authorship because sporting outcomes will usually be a result of a struggle 
between opposing competitors. But the outcome has to be a result of such a struggle – a joint 
authorship – if those endeavours are to have a point and for sport to be of interest to those 
watching.  
The account also explains the sense of indeterminism that is required. We saw that it could be taken 
to mean a world of pure chance, which we have already dismissed as no use to sport. But the other 
way in which it might be understood is simply as the negation of determinism. If the world is one 
that contains the dispositional modality, as we claim, then it is not a world of necessity. So it is not a 
deterministic world. But nor is it a world of pure chance. It is indeterministic in the weaker sense, 
meaning a denial of necessity. We have this third option, however. To deny necessity is not to go 
over to a world of complete contingency because there is the middle ground of the tendential view.  
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Chance, skill and luck 
Recent discussions of the role of luck in sport arise from the sorts of concerns we have addressed 
here. But they do so without invoking the explicit dispositional modality of the tendential view, 
which we claim would clarify some important distinctions. On chance, for instance, Kretchmar has 
said: 
 
Yet, we find chance elements in every game we play. Perhaps they have taken up residence 
because we have found no effective means for serving eviction notices. In sport’s patterned 
chaotic world of bouncing balls, predicting the direction and height of the next bounce may 
be impossible both in principle and in fact. But the more interesting question may be this. 
Even if we could rid sport of this counter-agency variable, would we want to do so? 
(Kretchmar 2012: 111) 
 
Simon (2007) argues for skill as the foundation of sport, for which chance would be a threat to a just 
and true outcome. However, even though Simon sees no value from having chance in sport, he also 
thinks it compatible with the exercise of skill. In simple terms, the skilful competitor is one who is 
able to take best advantage of good luck or get into a position where they are most likely to benefit 
from it. A rugby ball could bounce left or right, for instance, but a skilled player knows exactly where 
to be and how to be poised to take optimum advantage, regardless of which way the bounce goes. 
In contrast, all of de Wachter (1985) Loland (2002) and Kretchmar (2012) accept chance as a 
welcome part of sport: Loland because it ‘increases experiential values and adds to the openness of 
competitions’ (94) and Kretchmar because ‘We do not … want sport to become a too finely tuned 
merit assessment machine’ (112). Armed with the dispositional modality, it now seems possible to 
reconcile most of these views.  
In the first place, we have distinguished the case of pure chance from our dispositional modality of 
tendency and we do not take it that the latter is simply another presentation of the former. There 
are indeed some elements of pure chance in sport: the referee tosses a coin to decide which team 
kicks off, some bounces of the rugby ball are beyond anyone’s control, the sun might blind a player 
just as she is about to take a catch, in Australian Rules Football an umpire takes the throw-ins with 
his back to play, unsighted. Now there are a number of important questions concerning how much 
of this kind of pure chance that we want in sport. This is the kind of chance we take Kretchmar to be 
addressing in the above passage. Would we eliminate all such chance if we could? 
From this, however, we are separating cases that exhibit the dispositional modality. Here, although 
the athlete’s efforts do not guarantee their effects, they tend towards them in such a way that we 
rightly hold the player responsible for their outcomes. The golfer aims towards the hole, for 
example, in full concentration and a steady hand. The put sinks. Was the golfer responsible? Do they 
deserve credit? Certainly, we say. But the dispositional modality of causation tells us that even here 
the golfer did not guarantee the outcome: they merely produced it. A squirrel might have run across 
the green and stolen the ball. The ball might have been struck by lightning and incinerated. The 
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golfer had no guarantee against these interventions. But the shot played true and accurately 
strongly disposed towards the ball falling in the hole. Golfers retain control – some control – and 
even though they cannot control everything, their causal interventions in one degree or another 
tend towards certain results. As in golf, so in all other sports in some such way. The athlete’s actions, 
even though short of necessitating their effects, add something significantly more than pure chance 
into the equation. Thus, if we define luck as something over which we have no control, then pure 
chance elements of sport fall into that category. An athlete’s game-playing actions would not quite 
fit. Athletes contribute to outcomes. That may sometimes be thwarted by bad luck: where the 
squirrel steals a true shot. And there is good luck: where a shot is going wide but gets diverted into 
the hole by a gust of wind. But the fact that there could be lucky elements that might intervene and 
affect an outcome does not mean that the player had no control, if we divorce the notion of control 
from that of necessitation. Certainly if a player performs an action that tends towards a success and 
indeed produces it, then they are entitled to claim the credit. 
It would therefore be a mistake to think of skill and luck as being in complete opposition, even 
though we have argued they are distinct. Certainly, sporting prowess should not be thought of as 
something that is entirely divorced from good and bad fortune. Any cause can fail to produce its 
effect due to the possibility of intervention. And whether or not those interventions occur is often 
itself beyond the competitors’ control. While Loland and Kretchmar are willing to allow chance a 
place in sport, we now see that any hope of its complete eradication would be entirely chimerical. 
Any natural causal process is subject to prevention or interference (Mumford and Anjum 2011a: ch. 
3). The admission of elements of pure chance into sport seems less puzzling once one realises that 
even those aspects over which we exercise control are not cases of total control or guaranteeing. 
This line of thought does leave further questions. We might consider whether sports have exactly 
the balance right between chance and skill. If the best team lost too often, we might think that the 
sport does not adequately reward its own supposed excellences. But if the best team wins too often 
– virtually every time – we might start to find it dull to watch and lack motivation to play. But how 
this balance should be calibrated is partly a normative and partly also an empirical matter. If the best 
team wins 99% of the time it seems too predictable; if they win only 51% of the time, it seems too 
chancy. The popular and enduring spectator sports are almost certainly the ones that have got the 
balance about right, for this is sure to be a major factor in explaining our viewing behaviour. 
But a second issue concerns the contested nature of luck and skill in sport. What the loser calls bad 
luck, the winner calls skill. After-the-fact narratives are constructed that tell the story of the game, 
from a point of view, explaining the source of the victory. Where luck goes one’s way, it is tempting 
to put it down to ability. In defeat, it is tempting to dismiss one’s own failings as poor luck. Such 
issues are not for here except but to acknowledge that luck and ability claims within the sporting 
discourse cannot always be taken at face value. 
 
The meaning of sport 
Whether sport has any meaning is a moot point. Best (1974) some time ago told us that sport could 
not be about anything. And it is also moot whether there is an essence of sport (see Møller and 
THE TENDENTIAL THEORY OF SPORTING PROWESS 10 
 
Nauright (eds) 2003). Our initial task here was to make sense of our interest in sport. That rested, we 
argued, on the outcomes of sport being understood to be matters of less than necessity but more 
than pure contingency. This, we maintain, is an important enough conclusion, and escapes the 
dilemma with which we began. But it might also be wondered whether there is something more 
profound in this finding for the very nature of sport and life. 
A picture has been painted of sport as a striving towards victory where this exhibits a defiant 
exercise of free will in the face of any threat from necessity. Sport provides an arena in which we 
offer our best. We try to exercise our abilities to their maximum, knowing that we are sometimes 
the weaker but also that even the weak may triumph over a stronger opponent if they can play their 
best game, exercising the right causal powers at just the right time, in the right way, and under 
pressure of competition. This clash of relative powers, the sporting prowesses, shows us that there is 
a purpose in life that can be achieved even in the face of adversity. What better lesson can we take 
from sport out into non-sporting contexts? And what does this tell us about human embodied 
agency? In sport we face a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles, as Suits (2005, 55) 
put it. Why do we face unnecessary obstacles voluntarily? Their unnecessary nature shows that 
achievement of the lusory goals of sport is ultimately a worthless task. But it is in the exercise of our 
mental and physical abilities in sport, where they are not needed at that time for any practical 
purpose, that we truly reveal what is of intrinsic value to us. This much, Suits has told us. We have 
argued in this paper that what is of intrinsic value should include an account of the exercise of our 
agential powers as we try to achieve our goals. Sport is then a battle between these powers – these 




A way has been found to resolve the dilemma that sport is of no interest if the outcomes are either 
necessitated or a matter of pure chance. Instead it has been argued that in sport we pit the abilities 
and skills of the competitors against each other where these are dispositions tending towards 
success, minus any liabilities that are dispositions tending away from success. The relative degree of 
prowess dictates who are the stronger and weaker competitors. But this relative strength 
constitutes only a tendency towards victory or defeat.  
Such a tendency might be expected to produce victory for the stronger but there is a point in playing 
sport, and watching it played, precisely because that tendency can be counteracted by a relatively 
weaker opponent. Indeed, one of the most joyous outcomes in sport, when one otherwise has no 
interest in the outcome, is to see the weaker – the underdog – beat the stronger. This tells us 
something important about sport. It is not a flaw that the contest allowed the weaker to win. Rather, 
the possibility of such an outcome is of the essence of sport: a precondition of its very existence. 
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